America as the ‘Other’ ? Europe’s Security and Defence Identity in a Social Identity Perspective

By Prof. Dr Reinhard Wolf, Ernst Moritz Arndt University of Greifswald (Germany)

Will a widening transatlantic rift become the “midwife” of a European security identity and thus for a meaningful Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) ? Will a genuine European security identity finally be brought about in delineation, if not in opposition to the United States ? And will such European “we-feeling” henceforth have yet more negative implications for future western cooperation in that by leading to even further estrangement in transatlantic relations? Will it weaken NATO or is it even bound to put the very viability of the Atlantic Alliance at risk? Or will transatlantic commonalities, intra-European differences along with European military dependence continue to hamper the development of a common security identity which otherwise would enable EU members to act as a cohesive group? 

Ongoing events make such an analysis an urgent task. With the advent of the administration of George Bush, jr., transatlantic relations have become more complicated, if not altogether strained. On issues such as the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, the ban of land mines, the abrogation of the ABM Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, steel tariffs, agricultural subsidies and, last but not least, the problem of Iraq, the republican administration has demonstrated its distinctive approach to foreign affairs.  American unilateralism and Washington’s growing focus on military means have called into question traditional transatlantic ties. As a result of these dissensions, support for US leadership in global issues dropped by more than 20 percentage points in all major European states, while two thirds of EU citizens began to favor a superpower role for the European Union.  Moreover, policy approaches of various European states suddenly appear much more convergent than before.  Even conservative politicians, such as the chairman of the European Parliament’s committee on foreign relations, Elmar Brok, have come to view the US as “the other” that makes the Europeans feel and act as a distinctive group.  According to Brok, “it looks as if Washington is now assuming the role Moscow has played during the Cold War.” As he implicates, Washington could inadvertently provide the “glue” that brings about the European “we-feeling” in the field of foreign policy. In this way, a mutually reinforcing circle of American unilateralism and European identity construction would eventually deliver the death nails for NATO’s coffin. This momentous perspective makes it all the more imperative to assess the prospects for more European “we-feeling” in a transatlantic context.

In assessing the prospects for a stronger European security identity I depart from previous studies in several ways:  First, this lecture deals not just with processes which promote collective identities among previously individualistic, self-regarding states but rather focuses on factors which could tear apart an existing group (NATO) into two separate groups (CESDP, USA).  Second, unlike most constructivist analyses which tend to limit themselves to historical reconstruction of past identity changes, the lecture tries to make predictions for the development of European security identities. Third, to this end I shall not so much recur on IR theory as such but shall apply hypotheses derived from a prominent theory in social psychology:  Social identity theory and particularly its most recent variant, self-categorization theory. Such a cognitive approach offers greater potential for uncovering the roots of potential splits within a given group.  Self-categorization, after all, enables people to distinguish between different groups. It thus provides the crucial analytical basis for internalizing additional identity features, particularly the role conceptions and norms which are pertinent to a particular group.

In the first part of the lecture I shall briefly explain why creating a European defense identity among the public at large is indeed an important prerequisite for a meaningful European intervention capacity and why it is a crucial issue for transatlantic relations. The lecture's second part is dedicated to the factors which, according to constructivist theory, could bring about such a supranational identity, before I present, in the third part, the main findings and pertinent hypotheses of social identity theory. In the following part I apply these theoretical insights to the case of the EU by matching them with the latest opinion data gathered on both sides of the Atlantic. The conclusion summarizes the argument and puts it into the context of the current EU enlargement process.

As I will argue, a strong and distinct European security identity will hardly emerge in the near future.  Despite the recent transatlantic dissensions there are still common interests and some similarities which make it difficult for Europeans to categorize the US as part of their security out-group. In fact, in some respects Americans are (still?) more “European”, that is closer to the European average, than important European nations. The likely consequences of EU enlargement and the continued dependence on US military resources will further compromise the evolution of a special European “we-feeling”. Thus, unless the unilateralist approach of the current US administration will come to shape US attitudes and policies for a long time to come, a distinct European security identity will probably have to wait for the creation of a European federal state.